It seeks to incorporate emerging elements of sociological theory of the past two decades, as well as use the 4-Quadrant Framework of Integral Theory, to explain the phenomenon of how legitimacy has been withdrawn from the environmental governance structure for reasons that are both rooted in (Habermasian) Welfare State failures and Environmental/Technological failures (in Beck's Risk Society's terms).
CHAPTER 4
SOCIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE PROBLEM
The present chapter provides an overview of the most relevant elements from current sociological theory, which are being applied as a “macro social” framework in the development of the concept of environmental governance legitimation crisis (EGLC). In keeping with the Integral Theory Approach incorporated into the research design, these social theory concepts haven been articulated using the Four Quadrant model, based on the relationships between the behavioral, systemic, experiential and cultural dimensions of phenomena.
An understanding of the crisis from a systemic perspective
It is fitting to begin this social framework approach from a systemic perspective, since the characterization of the challenges faced by environmental governance as a legitimation crisis corresponds to a systems theory analysis. This usage of the term crisis originates in critical theory, specifically from the Marxist diagnostic of the contradictions of the capitalist system (economic crises of overproduction and underproduction) [1].
Jürgen Habermas sought to redefine the conception of crisis in critical theory, observing that in modern capitalism, the economic crisis of capitalism did not occur due to the transfer of the Economic system’s burdens to the Political Administrative system through the Welfare State. Habermas observed that if it was unable to resolve the functional problems of the economic system, the Political Administrative system would be subjected to a rationality crisis, analogous to the crisis of the economic system. However, in Habermas’ view, the rationality crisis is not inevitable, the State may be able to avert or delay the emergence of these contradictions. However, this situation is bound to lead to a new type of crisis, a legitimation crisis, derived from the very interventions of the Political Administrative system in the realm of the Socio-Cultural system. In other words, as the State begins to intervene in new areas of the Socio-Cultural system (that had until then been self-regulated through tradition) in order to address the ills generated by the economic system, it creates a new demand for legitimation that had not previously existed, in this way, the State eliminates the conditions of its own prior legitimation (such as the purely formal nature of democracy, the lack of popular participation, self-reflection, and discussion about precisely these policies of State intervention) and creates a condition where it is unable to comply with the plans and objectives it had set for itself. This leads to the withdrawal of legitimation by the people (the Socio-Cultural system) of the power of the Political Administrative system. (Ureña, 1998, pp. 112-113; Marshall & Goldstein, 2006, p. 220).
Elaborating on the Habermasian conception of a democratic, or Welfare State legitimation crisis, Marshall and Goldstein (2006) have recently proposed the conception of a fourth semi-autonomous system, the Ecological system, and the perception of a fourth type of crisis of capitalism, the environmental legitimation crisis. According to Marshall and Goldstein, the inability of the Political Administrative system to address the degradation of the three functions of the Ecological system: “supply depot, waste repository and living space” (p. 216) and protect the citizenry from the impacts of this degradation, leads to the State’s inability to fulfill its legitimation function. They classify three forms in which the perceptions of State failure manifest in the citizenry: recreancy, in other words, the perception that institutional actors “failed to carry out their responsibilities with the vigor necessary to merit the societal trust they covet”; agency capture, reflecting that “the views of a regulatory agency are more closely aligned with the industry it is supposed to regulate than with the interests of the public”; and finally the proliferation of grassroots environmental movements emerging in communities for self-protection due to the increased awareness of instances of contaminated communities (p. 220).
This conception of the environmental legitimacy crisis can be related to the conceptual development by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and others, of the notion of the risk society and of the resulting emergence of reflexive modernity. According to Beck (1998), the growing awareness about the emergence of “mega-hazards” created by the new nuclear and chemical industries is transforming the political dynamics of bureaucracies created to ensure the safety of the state and its inhabitants, on the one hand, but now seen as culprit of legalizing previously unseen dangers. This can lead to the “failure of institutions that derive their justification from the non-existence of hazard”. (p. 332). Furthermore, this generates an opportunity for a new kind of awareness, whereby
…the ubiquity of risk at least makes possible new kinds of democratic politics, where citizens do not accept the authority of states and professional risk apologists working for government or industry. Instead, citizens demand an effective voice in basic decisions about economic and technological development. (Dryzek, 2004, p.DOUBLE CHECK PAGE)
This new opportunities for democratic action will be the object of the next chapter concerning generative politics and deliberative environmental governance. The dynamics of how reflexive modernity is affecting the cultural sphere will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. At present, however, having outlined the historical and theoretical context in which the notion of crisis is used, it is now relevant to describe the specific characteristics of the conception of the environmental governance legitimation crisis which is being proposed herein.
This notion is not purely a democratic, or Welfare State, legitimation crisis, in the Habermasian sense, nor is it solely a crisis grounded in the lack of management of environmental degradation and the protection of local communities, in the way that Marshall and Goldstein have developed the concept. Instead, it is a particular form of convergence of both of the aforementioned crises. In the EGLC, the perceived lack of competence or political will (or both) by the Political Administrative system in fulfilling its Welfare State functions (as in the Habermasian model for the democratic legitimation crisis) can be an ideological driver of withdrawal of trust and active opposition by the environmental movement on social grounds (the opposition is prompted democratic, more than environmental, concerns).
Conversely, the lack of confidence in the effectiveness or transparency of the State’s environmental regulators can lead to opposition to the State’s management of natural resources (as supply depot, waste repository or living space) and this can in turn constrain its ability to perform its Social Welfare functions, thus aggravating the democratic legitimacy crisis. The intermingling of both types of legitimation crises introduces greater complexity, since as has been stated, each crisis reinforces the other. At other times, however, the two crises can, unexpectedly, affect State institutions that are opposite to each other. This can best illustrated by using the example of the widespread social movement support of ICE as a public institution, yet the steadfast opposition by grassroots and environmental movements to ICE’s hydroelectric infrastructure projects.
From a democratic legitimation perspective, ICE as a public monopolistic institution is emblematic of the Costa Rican Welfare State of the second half of the XX Century. Therefore, the protection of ICE from the privatizing trends that have marked the capitalist globalization policies, particularly since the 1980s in Latin America, is a strong coalescing stimulus for all Costa Rican social movements. However, ICE is also seen as an institution whose policies are generated by technocrats and experts, and is therefore identified as an institution that is part of the “hazard generating” industrial complex of the risk society. Therefore, the technical criteria used by ICE for social and environmental risk mitigation are no longer accepted by the new social movements of reflexive modernity, and despite the support it is allotted as a social welfare institution, its infrastructure projects are repeatedly subject to contestation by grassroots and environmental movements, a situation which in fact impedes it from performing its social welfare function.
This apparent contradiction thus illustrates that the phenomena that make up the current environmental governance legitimation crisis are not unidirectional, but represent a merger of the withdrawal of public legitimacy associated with at least these two functions: the democratic/welfare state function and the environmental/hazard management function.
The transformation of trust in the cultural dimension
The trends outlined concerning the systemic dimension (corresponding to the lower right quadrant of the collective, observable aspects of phenomena) will have repercussions in the cultural dimension (lower left quadrant of the intra-subjective aspect of phenomena). The most salient feature addressed in this framework in relation to this quadrant is the shift in the dynamics of trust, which Giddens (1994) describes as the shift from passive trust, which is based on tradition or pre-established social roles, to active trust, which is de-linked from prior power dynamics, rather it needs to be earned and is much more dependent on the existing contextual conditions. Since it emerges from a more reflexive population, it both demands more transparency from social relations and helps this transparency to come about. (p. 100). Giddens draws amply from the personal and family dimensions of social life to characterize these changes in cultural relations, thus he uses as illustrative examples of the emergence of active trust the emerging shifts in the social and gender structure of marriage relations, and the increasingly “negotiated” character of parental authority. (pp. 102-103).
The experience of polarized identities in the network society
At the level of experiential dimension (upper left quadrant of internal subjectivity) this is experienced by people in the central role of identity in the individual experience. According to Castells (1997) “identity is the source of experience and meaning for people” and it can be defined as “the process of construction of meaning based on a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attributes, which are given priority over the other sources of meaning”. (p. 28). Hence, in reflexive modernity, how I situate myself through my conceptualization of meaning, based on which cultural aspects are given prevalence, will affect my subjective experience.
For Castells, individuals are presently constructing their identities along two main processes, or rooted in two main sources: legitimizing identities, which are identities “introduced by the dominant social institutions to extend and rationalize their domain over social actors… and resistance identities, which are “generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions which are devalued or stigmatized by the dominant logic, and therefore construct trenches of resistance and survival based on different or opposite principles to those that imbue societal institutions” (1997, p. 30).
Castells envisions a third type of identity, project identities, which arise when social actors “based on the cultural materials available to them, construct a new identity that redefines their position in society, and in doing so, seeks the transformation of the whole social structure” (1997, p. 30). While Castells suggests that it is from resistance identities that project identities may arise through particular contextual processes, his formulation is still vague regarding how these constructs will transcend their fixation on resisting the dominant culture through antipodal stances and be able to formulate their own cultural project.
In the case of the present environmental governance legitimation crisis, the entrenchment of both legitimizing and resistance identities, fueled by the tension between the legitimizing function of the State and the increased vigilance that emerges from reflexive modernity, has led to a social polarization that fosters groupthink, reduces tolerance, and can even cloud the issues in such a way that the emergence of project identities is impaired.
One example of this situation is the development of positional cleavages around the debate concerning energy governance, thus reinforcing the illusions of bipolarity (in other words, the pretense that the debate has only two sides) and of unanimity (that everyone who is arguing on the same side is doing so motivated by the exact same interests), both of which have been outlined in the hypothesis to this research endeavor.
In closer, more reflexive inspection, it is possible to see that there are at least six different arrays of cultural attributes or sources of meaning that represent a better characterization of the number of sides to the issue. These are: (a) the local autonomy view, which is primarily concerned that the energy services be provided reliably but without impacting their property or community; (b) the entrepreneurial view, which considers that energy is both a necessary input for production, and a valuable opportunity for generating value through a new commodity; (c) the conservationist view, which is primarily concerned about ensuring the long-term viability of ecosystems and believes that energy supply considerations are near sighted and irrational; (d) the political ecology view, which sees the debate about energy development as a suitable strategic area to block and hold back the capitalist forces that prey on people and the environment; (e) the managerial view that perceives its responsibility as solely related to the provision of a reliable services that can continually keep up with forecasts of a growing demand; and (f) the clean technology view which perceives that opportunities for clean development need to be developed now, or the increased pressure on resources may lead to less rational resource use decision in the future.
While all of these are viable identities for constructing parts of the solution, the social polarization has mixed them together in the different fronts, making it unlikely for a rational solution to their needs to be developed.
The behavioral dimension: individual manifestations on the ground
At the level of the individual observable outcomes, the situation can be characterized as the result of the polarization into legitimizing and resistance stances, which lead to a constantly contentious environment and little room for searching increased understanding, and much less so, consensus.
This means that the actions being formulated belong to two primary types of actions:
growth actions, which are related to increasing the accumulation function of the Political Administrative system, producing either more infrastructure directly or more partnership arrangements directed at increasing the available capital and capacity for growth; and blocking actions, directed at stopping the ability of the Political Administrative system to fulfill its accumulation function and to further weaken its level of legitimacy.
Neither of these actions, however, are oriented at resolving the capacity of the State to fulfill its accumulation function (through the provision of services to that enable the functioning of the Economic system) and its legitimation function (by enhancing its capacity to both redistribute wealth and safeguard individuals from economic and environmental insecurities). As a result, the State’s inaction and the lack of an effective governance both increase human insecurities and reduce the State’s legitimacy.
SOCIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE PROBLEM
The present chapter provides an overview of the most relevant elements from current sociological theory, which are being applied as a “macro social” framework in the development of the concept of environmental governance legitimation crisis (EGLC). In keeping with the Integral Theory Approach incorporated into the research design, these social theory concepts haven been articulated using the Four Quadrant model, based on the relationships between the behavioral, systemic, experiential and cultural dimensions of phenomena.
An understanding of the crisis from a systemic perspective
It is fitting to begin this social framework approach from a systemic perspective, since the characterization of the challenges faced by environmental governance as a legitimation crisis corresponds to a systems theory analysis. This usage of the term crisis originates in critical theory, specifically from the Marxist diagnostic of the contradictions of the capitalist system (economic crises of overproduction and underproduction) [1].
Jürgen Habermas sought to redefine the conception of crisis in critical theory, observing that in modern capitalism, the economic crisis of capitalism did not occur due to the transfer of the Economic system’s burdens to the Political Administrative system through the Welfare State. Habermas observed that if it was unable to resolve the functional problems of the economic system, the Political Administrative system would be subjected to a rationality crisis, analogous to the crisis of the economic system. However, in Habermas’ view, the rationality crisis is not inevitable, the State may be able to avert or delay the emergence of these contradictions. However, this situation is bound to lead to a new type of crisis, a legitimation crisis, derived from the very interventions of the Political Administrative system in the realm of the Socio-Cultural system. In other words, as the State begins to intervene in new areas of the Socio-Cultural system (that had until then been self-regulated through tradition) in order to address the ills generated by the economic system, it creates a new demand for legitimation that had not previously existed, in this way, the State eliminates the conditions of its own prior legitimation (such as the purely formal nature of democracy, the lack of popular participation, self-reflection, and discussion about precisely these policies of State intervention) and creates a condition where it is unable to comply with the plans and objectives it had set for itself. This leads to the withdrawal of legitimation by the people (the Socio-Cultural system) of the power of the Political Administrative system. (Ureña, 1998, pp. 112-113; Marshall & Goldstein, 2006, p. 220).
Elaborating on the Habermasian conception of a democratic, or Welfare State legitimation crisis, Marshall and Goldstein (2006) have recently proposed the conception of a fourth semi-autonomous system, the Ecological system, and the perception of a fourth type of crisis of capitalism, the environmental legitimation crisis. According to Marshall and Goldstein, the inability of the Political Administrative system to address the degradation of the three functions of the Ecological system: “supply depot, waste repository and living space” (p. 216) and protect the citizenry from the impacts of this degradation, leads to the State’s inability to fulfill its legitimation function. They classify three forms in which the perceptions of State failure manifest in the citizenry: recreancy, in other words, the perception that institutional actors “failed to carry out their responsibilities with the vigor necessary to merit the societal trust they covet”; agency capture, reflecting that “the views of a regulatory agency are more closely aligned with the industry it is supposed to regulate than with the interests of the public”; and finally the proliferation of grassroots environmental movements emerging in communities for self-protection due to the increased awareness of instances of contaminated communities (p. 220).
This conception of the environmental legitimacy crisis can be related to the conceptual development by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and others, of the notion of the risk society and of the resulting emergence of reflexive modernity. According to Beck (1998), the growing awareness about the emergence of “mega-hazards” created by the new nuclear and chemical industries is transforming the political dynamics of bureaucracies created to ensure the safety of the state and its inhabitants, on the one hand, but now seen as culprit of legalizing previously unseen dangers. This can lead to the “failure of institutions that derive their justification from the non-existence of hazard”. (p. 332). Furthermore, this generates an opportunity for a new kind of awareness, whereby
…the ubiquity of risk at least makes possible new kinds of democratic politics, where citizens do not accept the authority of states and professional risk apologists working for government or industry. Instead, citizens demand an effective voice in basic decisions about economic and technological development. (Dryzek, 2004, p.DOUBLE CHECK PAGE)
This new opportunities for democratic action will be the object of the next chapter concerning generative politics and deliberative environmental governance. The dynamics of how reflexive modernity is affecting the cultural sphere will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. At present, however, having outlined the historical and theoretical context in which the notion of crisis is used, it is now relevant to describe the specific characteristics of the conception of the environmental governance legitimation crisis which is being proposed herein.
This notion is not purely a democratic, or Welfare State, legitimation crisis, in the Habermasian sense, nor is it solely a crisis grounded in the lack of management of environmental degradation and the protection of local communities, in the way that Marshall and Goldstein have developed the concept. Instead, it is a particular form of convergence of both of the aforementioned crises. In the EGLC, the perceived lack of competence or political will (or both) by the Political Administrative system in fulfilling its Welfare State functions (as in the Habermasian model for the democratic legitimation crisis) can be an ideological driver of withdrawal of trust and active opposition by the environmental movement on social grounds (the opposition is prompted democratic, more than environmental, concerns).
Conversely, the lack of confidence in the effectiveness or transparency of the State’s environmental regulators can lead to opposition to the State’s management of natural resources (as supply depot, waste repository or living space) and this can in turn constrain its ability to perform its Social Welfare functions, thus aggravating the democratic legitimacy crisis. The intermingling of both types of legitimation crises introduces greater complexity, since as has been stated, each crisis reinforces the other. At other times, however, the two crises can, unexpectedly, affect State institutions that are opposite to each other. This can best illustrated by using the example of the widespread social movement support of ICE as a public institution, yet the steadfast opposition by grassroots and environmental movements to ICE’s hydroelectric infrastructure projects.
From a democratic legitimation perspective, ICE as a public monopolistic institution is emblematic of the Costa Rican Welfare State of the second half of the XX Century. Therefore, the protection of ICE from the privatizing trends that have marked the capitalist globalization policies, particularly since the 1980s in Latin America, is a strong coalescing stimulus for all Costa Rican social movements. However, ICE is also seen as an institution whose policies are generated by technocrats and experts, and is therefore identified as an institution that is part of the “hazard generating” industrial complex of the risk society. Therefore, the technical criteria used by ICE for social and environmental risk mitigation are no longer accepted by the new social movements of reflexive modernity, and despite the support it is allotted as a social welfare institution, its infrastructure projects are repeatedly subject to contestation by grassroots and environmental movements, a situation which in fact impedes it from performing its social welfare function.
This apparent contradiction thus illustrates that the phenomena that make up the current environmental governance legitimation crisis are not unidirectional, but represent a merger of the withdrawal of public legitimacy associated with at least these two functions: the democratic/welfare state function and the environmental/hazard management function.
The transformation of trust in the cultural dimension
The trends outlined concerning the systemic dimension (corresponding to the lower right quadrant of the collective, observable aspects of phenomena) will have repercussions in the cultural dimension (lower left quadrant of the intra-subjective aspect of phenomena). The most salient feature addressed in this framework in relation to this quadrant is the shift in the dynamics of trust, which Giddens (1994) describes as the shift from passive trust, which is based on tradition or pre-established social roles, to active trust, which is de-linked from prior power dynamics, rather it needs to be earned and is much more dependent on the existing contextual conditions. Since it emerges from a more reflexive population, it both demands more transparency from social relations and helps this transparency to come about. (p. 100). Giddens draws amply from the personal and family dimensions of social life to characterize these changes in cultural relations, thus he uses as illustrative examples of the emergence of active trust the emerging shifts in the social and gender structure of marriage relations, and the increasingly “negotiated” character of parental authority. (pp. 102-103).
The experience of polarized identities in the network society
At the level of experiential dimension (upper left quadrant of internal subjectivity) this is experienced by people in the central role of identity in the individual experience. According to Castells (1997) “identity is the source of experience and meaning for people” and it can be defined as “the process of construction of meaning based on a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attributes, which are given priority over the other sources of meaning”. (p. 28). Hence, in reflexive modernity, how I situate myself through my conceptualization of meaning, based on which cultural aspects are given prevalence, will affect my subjective experience.
For Castells, individuals are presently constructing their identities along two main processes, or rooted in two main sources: legitimizing identities, which are identities “introduced by the dominant social institutions to extend and rationalize their domain over social actors… and resistance identities, which are “generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions which are devalued or stigmatized by the dominant logic, and therefore construct trenches of resistance and survival based on different or opposite principles to those that imbue societal institutions” (1997, p. 30).
Castells envisions a third type of identity, project identities, which arise when social actors “based on the cultural materials available to them, construct a new identity that redefines their position in society, and in doing so, seeks the transformation of the whole social structure” (1997, p. 30). While Castells suggests that it is from resistance identities that project identities may arise through particular contextual processes, his formulation is still vague regarding how these constructs will transcend their fixation on resisting the dominant culture through antipodal stances and be able to formulate their own cultural project.
In the case of the present environmental governance legitimation crisis, the entrenchment of both legitimizing and resistance identities, fueled by the tension between the legitimizing function of the State and the increased vigilance that emerges from reflexive modernity, has led to a social polarization that fosters groupthink, reduces tolerance, and can even cloud the issues in such a way that the emergence of project identities is impaired.
One example of this situation is the development of positional cleavages around the debate concerning energy governance, thus reinforcing the illusions of bipolarity (in other words, the pretense that the debate has only two sides) and of unanimity (that everyone who is arguing on the same side is doing so motivated by the exact same interests), both of which have been outlined in the hypothesis to this research endeavor.
In closer, more reflexive inspection, it is possible to see that there are at least six different arrays of cultural attributes or sources of meaning that represent a better characterization of the number of sides to the issue. These are: (a) the local autonomy view, which is primarily concerned that the energy services be provided reliably but without impacting their property or community; (b) the entrepreneurial view, which considers that energy is both a necessary input for production, and a valuable opportunity for generating value through a new commodity; (c) the conservationist view, which is primarily concerned about ensuring the long-term viability of ecosystems and believes that energy supply considerations are near sighted and irrational; (d) the political ecology view, which sees the debate about energy development as a suitable strategic area to block and hold back the capitalist forces that prey on people and the environment; (e) the managerial view that perceives its responsibility as solely related to the provision of a reliable services that can continually keep up with forecasts of a growing demand; and (f) the clean technology view which perceives that opportunities for clean development need to be developed now, or the increased pressure on resources may lead to less rational resource use decision in the future.
While all of these are viable identities for constructing parts of the solution, the social polarization has mixed them together in the different fronts, making it unlikely for a rational solution to their needs to be developed.
The behavioral dimension: individual manifestations on the ground
At the level of the individual observable outcomes, the situation can be characterized as the result of the polarization into legitimizing and resistance stances, which lead to a constantly contentious environment and little room for searching increased understanding, and much less so, consensus.
This means that the actions being formulated belong to two primary types of actions:
growth actions, which are related to increasing the accumulation function of the Political Administrative system, producing either more infrastructure directly or more partnership arrangements directed at increasing the available capital and capacity for growth; and blocking actions, directed at stopping the ability of the Political Administrative system to fulfill its accumulation function and to further weaken its level of legitimacy.
Neither of these actions, however, are oriented at resolving the capacity of the State to fulfill its accumulation function (through the provision of services to that enable the functioning of the Economic system) and its legitimation function (by enhancing its capacity to both redistribute wealth and safeguard individuals from economic and environmental insecurities). As a result, the State’s inaction and the lack of an effective governance both increase human insecurities and reduce the State’s legitimacy.
Notes:
[1] The first contradiction of capitalism, predicted by Marx, emerges “because the worker produces more value that he or she is paid in wages, an economic crisis emerges because of overproduction or overconsumption” (Leff, cited in Marshall & Goldstein, 2006, p. 218). The second contradiction of capitalism was conceptualized by “ecological Marxism” as “based on the limitations imposed by natural resources and leads to a liquidity crisis caused by underproduction” (Foster, cited in Marshall & Goldstein, 2006, p. 219; O’Connor, 1998, p. 441).
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