Thursday, June 21, 2007

Environmental Governance Legitimation Crisis - A 'macro-sociologial' framework

The following is the first draft of my Chapter 4: "Sociological Framework - an Environmental Governance Legitimation Crisis".

It seeks to incorporate emerging elements of sociological theory of the past two decades, as well as use the 4-Quadrant Framework of Integral Theory, to explain the phenomenon of how legitimacy has been withdrawn from the environmental governance structure for reasons that are both rooted in (Habermasian) Welfare State failures and Environmental/Technological failures (in Beck's Risk Society's terms).

CHAPTER 4
SOCIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE PROBLEM


The present chapter provides an overview of the most relevant elements from current sociological theory, which are being applied as a “macro social” framework in the development of the concept of environmental governance legitimation crisis (EGLC). In keeping with the Integral Theory Approach incorporated into the research design, these social theory concepts haven been articulated using the Four Quadrant model, based on the relationships between the behavioral, systemic, experiential and cultural dimensions of phenomena.

An understanding of the crisis from a systemic perspective

It is fitting to begin this social framework approach from a systemic perspective, since the characterization of the challenges faced by environmental governance as a legitimation crisis corresponds to a systems theory analysis. This usage of the term crisis originates in critical theory, specifically from the Marxist diagnostic of the contradictions of the capitalist system (economic crises of overproduction and underproduction) [1].

Jürgen Habermas sought to redefine the conception of crisis in critical theory, observing that in modern capitalism, the economic crisis of capitalism did not occur due to the transfer of the Economic system’s burdens to the Political Administrative system through the Welfare State. Habermas observed that if it was unable to resolve the functional problems of the economic system, the Political Administrative system would be subjected to a rationality crisis, analogous to the crisis of the economic system. However, in Habermas’ view, the rationality crisis is not inevitable, the State may be able to avert or delay the emergence of these contradictions. However, this situation is bound to lead to a new type of crisis, a legitimation crisis, derived from the very interventions of the Political Administrative system in the realm of the Socio-Cultural system. In other words, as the State begins to intervene in new areas of the Socio-Cultural system (that had until then been self-regulated through tradition) in order to address the ills generated by the economic system, it creates a new demand for legitimation that had not previously existed, in this way, the State eliminates the conditions of its own prior legitimation (such as the purely formal nature of democracy, the lack of popular participation, self-reflection, and discussion about precisely these policies of State intervention) and creates a condition where it is unable to comply with the plans and objectives it had set for itself. This leads to the withdrawal of legitimation by the people (the Socio-Cultural system) of the power of the Political Administrative system. (Ureña, 1998, pp. 112-113; Marshall & Goldstein, 2006, p. 220).

Elaborating on the Habermasian conception of a democratic, or Welfare State legitimation crisis, Marshall and Goldstein (2006) have recently proposed the conception of a fourth semi-autonomous system, the Ecological system, and the perception of a fourth type of crisis of capitalism, the environmental legitimation crisis. According to Marshall and Goldstein, the inability of the Political Administrative system to address the degradation of the three functions of the Ecological system: “supply depot, waste repository and living space” (p. 216) and protect the citizenry from the impacts of this degradation, leads to the State’s inability to fulfill its legitimation function. They classify three forms in which the perceptions of State failure manifest in the citizenry: recreancy, in other words, the perception that institutional actors “failed to carry out their responsibilities with the vigor necessary to merit the societal trust they covet”; agency capture, reflecting that “the views of a regulatory agency are more closely aligned with the industry it is supposed to regulate than with the interests of the public”; and finally the proliferation of grassroots environmental movements emerging in communities for self-protection due to the increased awareness of instances of contaminated communities (p. 220).

This conception of the environmental legitimacy crisis can be related to the conceptual development by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and others, of the notion of the risk society and of the resulting emergence of reflexive modernity. According to Beck (1998), the growing awareness about the emergence of “mega-hazards” created by the new nuclear and chemical industries is transforming the political dynamics of bureaucracies created to ensure the safety of the state and its inhabitants, on the one hand, but now seen as culprit of legalizing previously unseen dangers. This can lead to the “failure of institutions that derive their justification from the non-existence of hazard”. (p. 332). Furthermore, this generates an opportunity for a new kind of awareness, whereby
…the ubiquity of risk at least makes possible new kinds of democratic politics, where citizens do not accept the authority of states and professional risk apologists working for government or industry. Instead, citizens demand an effective voice in basic decisions about economic and technological development. (Dryzek, 2004, p.DOUBLE CHECK PAGE)

This new opportunities for democratic action will be the object of the next chapter concerning generative politics and deliberative environmental governance. The dynamics of how reflexive modernity is affecting the cultural sphere will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. At present, however, having outlined the historical and theoretical context in which the notion of crisis is used, it is now relevant to describe the specific characteristics of the conception of the environmental governance legitimation crisis which is being proposed herein.

This notion is not purely a democratic, or Welfare State, legitimation crisis, in the Habermasian sense, nor is it solely a crisis grounded in the lack of management of environmental degradation and the protection of local communities, in the way that Marshall and Goldstein have developed the concept. Instead, it is a particular form of convergence of both of the aforementioned crises. In the EGLC, the perceived lack of competence or political will (or both) by the Political Administrative system in fulfilling its Welfare State functions (as in the Habermasian model for the democratic legitimation crisis) can be an ideological driver of withdrawal of trust and active opposition by the environmental movement on social grounds (the opposition is prompted democratic, more than environmental, concerns).

Conversely, the lack of confidence in the effectiveness or transparency of the State’s environmental regulators can lead to opposition to the State’s management of natural resources (as supply depot, waste repository or living space) and this can in turn constrain its ability to perform its Social Welfare functions, thus aggravating the democratic legitimacy crisis. The intermingling of both types of legitimation crises introduces greater complexity, since as has been stated, each crisis reinforces the other. At other times, however, the two crises can, unexpectedly, affect State institutions that are opposite to each other. This can best illustrated by using the example of the widespread social movement support of ICE as a public institution, yet the steadfast opposition by grassroots and environmental movements to ICE’s hydroelectric infrastructure projects.

From a democratic legitimation perspective, ICE as a public monopolistic institution is emblematic of the Costa Rican Welfare State of the second half of the XX Century. Therefore, the protection of ICE from the privatizing trends that have marked the capitalist globalization policies, particularly since the 1980s in Latin America, is a strong coalescing stimulus for all Costa Rican social movements. However, ICE is also seen as an institution whose policies are generated by technocrats and experts, and is therefore identified as an institution that is part of the “hazard generating” industrial complex of the risk society. Therefore, the technical criteria used by ICE for social and environmental risk mitigation are no longer accepted by the new social movements of reflexive modernity, and despite the support it is allotted as a social welfare institution, its infrastructure projects are repeatedly subject to contestation by grassroots and environmental movements, a situation which in fact impedes it from performing its social welfare function.

This apparent contradiction thus illustrates that the phenomena that make up the current environmental governance legitimation crisis are not unidirectional, but represent a merger of the withdrawal of public legitimacy associated with at least these two functions: the democratic/welfare state function and the environmental/hazard management function.

The transformation of trust in the cultural dimension

The trends outlined concerning the systemic dimension (corresponding to the lower right quadrant of the collective, observable aspects of phenomena) will have repercussions in the cultural dimension (lower left quadrant of the intra-subjective aspect of phenomena). The most salient feature addressed in this framework in relation to this quadrant is the shift in the dynamics of trust, which Giddens (1994) describes as the shift from passive trust, which is based on tradition or pre-established social roles, to active trust, which is de-linked from prior power dynamics, rather it needs to be earned and is much more dependent on the existing contextual conditions. Since it emerges from a more reflexive population, it both demands more transparency from social relations and helps this transparency to come about. (p. 100). Giddens draws amply from the personal and family dimensions of social life to characterize these changes in cultural relations, thus he uses as illustrative examples of the emergence of active trust the emerging shifts in the social and gender structure of marriage relations, and the increasingly “negotiated” character of parental authority. (pp. 102-103).

The experience of polarized identities in the network society

At the level of experiential dimension (upper left quadrant of internal subjectivity) this is experienced by people in the central role of identity in the individual experience. According to Castells (1997) “identity is the source of experience and meaning for people” and it can be defined as “the process of construction of meaning based on a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attributes, which are given priority over the other sources of meaning”. (p. 28). Hence, in reflexive modernity, how I situate myself through my conceptualization of meaning, based on which cultural aspects are given prevalence, will affect my subjective experience.

For Castells, individuals are presently constructing their identities along two main processes, or rooted in two main sources: legitimizing identities, which are identities “introduced by the dominant social institutions to extend and rationalize their domain over social actors… and resistance identities, which are “generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions which are devalued or stigmatized by the dominant logic, and therefore construct trenches of resistance and survival based on different or opposite principles to those that imbue societal institutions” (1997, p. 30).

Castells envisions a third type of identity, project identities, which arise when social actors “based on the cultural materials available to them, construct a new identity that redefines their position in society, and in doing so, seeks the transformation of the whole social structure” (1997, p. 30). While Castells suggests that it is from resistance identities that project identities may arise through particular contextual processes, his formulation is still vague regarding how these constructs will transcend their fixation on resisting the dominant culture through antipodal stances and be able to formulate their own cultural project.

In the case of the present environmental governance legitimation crisis, the entrenchment of both legitimizing and resistance identities, fueled by the tension between the legitimizing function of the State and the increased vigilance that emerges from reflexive modernity, has led to a social polarization that fosters groupthink, reduces tolerance, and can even cloud the issues in such a way that the emergence of project identities is impaired.

One example of this situation is the development of positional cleavages around the debate concerning energy governance, thus reinforcing the illusions of bipolarity (in other words, the pretense that the debate has only two sides) and of unanimity (that everyone who is arguing on the same side is doing so motivated by the exact same interests), both of which have been outlined in the hypothesis to this research endeavor.

In closer, more reflexive inspection, it is possible to see that there are at least six different arrays of cultural attributes or sources of meaning that represent a better characterization of the number of sides to the issue. These are: (a) the local autonomy view, which is primarily concerned that the energy services be provided reliably but without impacting their property or community; (b) the entrepreneurial view, which considers that energy is both a necessary input for production, and a valuable opportunity for generating value through a new commodity; (c) the conservationist view, which is primarily concerned about ensuring the long-term viability of ecosystems and believes that energy supply considerations are near sighted and irrational; (d) the political ecology view, which sees the debate about energy development as a suitable strategic area to block and hold back the capitalist forces that prey on people and the environment; (e) the managerial view that perceives its responsibility as solely related to the provision of a reliable services that can continually keep up with forecasts of a growing demand; and (f) the clean technology view which perceives that opportunities for clean development need to be developed now, or the increased pressure on resources may lead to less rational resource use decision in the future.

While all of these are viable identities for constructing parts of the solution, the social polarization has mixed them together in the different fronts, making it unlikely for a rational solution to their needs to be developed.

The behavioral dimension: individual manifestations on the ground

At the level of the individual observable outcomes, the situation can be characterized as the result of the polarization into legitimizing and resistance stances, which lead to a constantly contentious environment and little room for searching increased understanding, and much less so, consensus.

This means that the actions being formulated belong to two primary types of actions:
growth actions, which are related to increasing the accumulation function of the Political Administrative system, producing either more infrastructure directly or more partnership arrangements directed at increasing the available capital and capacity for growth; and blocking actions, directed at stopping the ability of the Political Administrative system to fulfill its accumulation function and to further weaken its level of legitimacy.

Neither of these actions, however, are oriented at resolving the capacity of the State to fulfill its accumulation function (through the provision of services to that enable the functioning of the Economic system) and its legitimation function (by enhancing its capacity to both redistribute wealth and safeguard individuals from economic and environmental insecurities). As a result, the State’s inaction and the lack of an effective governance both increase human insecurities and reduce the State’s legitimacy.

Notes:

[1] The first contradiction of capitalism, predicted by Marx, emerges “because the worker produces more value that he or she is paid in wages, an economic crisis emerges because of overproduction or overconsumption” (Leff, cited in Marshall & Goldstein, 2006, p. 218). The second contradiction of capitalism was conceptualized by “ecological Marxism” as “based on the limitations imposed by natural resources and leads to a liquidity crisis caused by underproduction” (Foster, cited in Marshall & Goldstein, 2006, p. 219; O’Connor, 1998, p. 441).

Monday, June 4, 2007

Latest draft of Rationale

Here is the latest draft of the Rationale Section of my Thesis.

I've recently reworked the hypothesis section. As always, I hope you enjoy, but best of all if you can provide feedback.

Hugs,

Checho.


REDISCOVERING DEMOCRACY: DELIBERATING ENVIRONMENTAL INSECURITIES IN THE COSTA RICAN POWER SECTOR

RATIONALE

The Costa Rican power sector is facing a deadlock that prevents the country from articulating a coherent, legitimized and sustainable electricity governance strategy. The standoff between social movements, on the one hand, and government planners and public and private generation companies, on the other, has been building up for close to a decade, and gained momentum in 2000, as a result of popular protests that successfully prevented Congress from passing a legal Bill promoting the partial privatization of the state owned utility (ICE). The main points of contention are the construction of new hydroelectric projects and the participation of the private sector in energy generation.

While social opposition has been successful in preventing or delaying several hydroelectric projects, through diverse tactics that include roadblocks, municipal referendums, and Constitutional appeals (Programa Estado de la Nacion, 2005, p. 218), no substantial efforts have been made to promote a viable clean substitute or to substantially reduce consumption. This situation, combined with subsidiary factors (such as the delays in commissioning of a planned thermal powerplant), has led to rising electricity deficits for 2006-2008.

Energy planners from ICE have turned to short-term fixes, like electricity imports and leasing or buying excess power from privately-owned diesel generators, to supply the steady growth in demand (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad [ICE], 2006, p. 40). From an energy and environmental security perspective, this not only leads to an increased national carbon footprint, due to expanded fossil-fuel generation, but it also reduces the utility’s capacity to adapt to weather fluctuations (like reduced rainfall regimes) or accidental downtime. These factors had a significant role in causing the crisis in energy supply that the country experienced last April, where homes and businesses throughout the country had to endure unscheduled power cuts lasting sometimes more than five hours.

The standoff exemplifies many elements of conflict escalation, such as group polarization, the rise of contentious norms and militant leadership, and the illusion of unanimity (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1994, pp. 92-94; Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli & Steiner, 2004, p. 16). However, the broader context of the conflict also offers reasons to be hopeful about the possibility of leading the debate towards less polarized interactions. The current administration’s commitment to steer Costa Rica on the path of becoming first country to generate all its electricity from renewables by 2021 (Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica, 2007, p. 81) creates pressures (whether the government acknowledges it or not) to address communal concerns in order to gain support for some hydroelectric plants, given the effectiveness of opposition thus far.

Another encouraging sign is the presence of critical reflection in some of the views held by environmental activists, regarding the fact that despite all of the movement’s accomplishments, more attention needs to be paid to the construction of alternatives (Castro, 2005, p. 48). A third hopeful element is the occurrence of past multi-stakeholder collaborative interactions in environmental governance, of which the most relevant to the issue at hand was the consensus process carried out in 2002-2004 to produce a draft Water Resources Law Bill. (Aguilar et. al., 2004, p. 11).

Recognizing the fundamental role of inter-group dynamics and institutional barriers in perpetuating this conflict, the present Masters Thesis seeks to explore how a particular stream of democratic practice, deliberative democracy, can contribute to the recognition of mutual concerns and to the creation of a space for the outlining of solutions. Deliberative approaches emphasize elements generally neglected in habitual power sector institutional arrangements, such as full participation and the promotion of enlightened understanding (Farrelly, 2004, p. 3). However, under certain conditions it has been argued that deliberation may at times exacerbate polarization. (Steenbergen et al., 2004, p. 17).

Therefore, the questions posed by this Thesis are: what value can deliberative democracy offer to environmental governance in Costa Rica? and what are the obstacles to deliberation in the context of the Costa Rican power sector? The objectives that will guide the research to be undertaken will therefore be:

a) To seek empirical verification of the potential benefits of democratic deliberation in the context of environmental governance in Costa Rica; and

b) To determine major barriers to deliberation among stakeholders in the country’s power subsector.

At this early stage of the project, it is possible to sketch the following preliminary hypotheses based on the researcher’s experience working with other stakeholders in the power sector, and on the bibliographic research that has been carried out concerning the applications of deliberation to environmental governance:

• Although the issues under dispute in power sector governance conflicts are commonly depicted as two-sided (for example: pro versus anti hydroelectricity; for or against private sector participation in generation; or supporting versus undermining ICE’s sovereignty) the actual diversity of viewpoints is much greater. The illusion of bipolarity is a result of an adversarial approach that has characterized all frames of the issue. This suggests that none of the discourses of the stakeholders engaged with this issue manage to integrate the three key elements of deliberative interaction: inclusion, dialogue and self-reflection.

• As a corollary to the previous hypothesis, although the reasons that multiple stakeholders have for opposing or supporting a position are also diverse, this is obscured by an illusion of unanimity, that is, stakeholders will tend to believe that all people arguing for or against a given action or policy are doing so for nearly identical reasons. This encourages groupthink between all those who are on the same side of an issue, and the fundamental attribution error in interpreting the character and motivations of all those who are on the opposing side.

• When people speak up or take action to promote or oppose a specific energy infrastructure project or to advocate a particular energy sector institutional model, their actions are influenced in part by their views about democracy. People’s concerns about the functioning and accountability of public service institutions, or about the distribution of costs and benefits from natural resource-based production, are informed and shaped by their individual and collective frames about how the governance of collective needs and endowments.

• These views about democracy, particularly as they become central to the conformation of movement identity and to the characterization of movement opponents, can lose their accuracy and become more like slogans used for mobilization. This lack of dialogue and reflection about the movement’s democratic principles is one of the main behaviors that allow social polarization.

• Increasing the deliberative quality of democratic practice, by promoting a greater integration of the three key principles of deliberation: inclusion, dialogue and self-reflection, in the exchanges between stakeholders with shared interests as well as between those who have opposing interests, can help overcome the stalemate by creating clear expectations about the ground rules for fairness, legitimacy and effectiveness in the search for solutions.

• Directing attention towards the question of “the quality of democracy we want” can reduce escalation by focusing away from blame and “enemy images”, and help “expand the pie” in the search for solutions. Deliberation can be an attractive concept for both sides, because it stresses participation, which is attractive to social movements, and rational understanding, which is attractive to generators and policy-makers.

Just as the “failed states” paradigm, was useful to environmental security in its initial years (dominated at the time by “national security” thinking) because it articulated the notion of environment-driven conflict as a threat to democracy; this thesis seeks to promote a paradigm of “deliberative environmental governance” that from a human security perspective, focuses on the need to “rehabilitate” the practices of decision-making and participation to promote more pluralistic understanding and legitimacy in environmental governance and enhance the social will to manage resources and constraints.

Saturday, June 2, 2007

A study on subjectivities and the "emotional intelligence" of energy governance

Governance as a detour from compassion in social change

I started my exploration on governance seeking a balanced approach to the question of compassionate practice in green movements. At first, I had been looking at compassionate activism, a well-established tradition in Nonviolence Movements, and the opportunities for translating it into mainstream belief in at least some sectors of environmentalism.

However, it soon dawned on me that promoting compassion only on the part of activists was a lopsided way of going about it. My "epiphany" at the Orchidea retreat had pushed me to explore the role of enemy images in all perspectives of environmental discourse (and broader still, to labor and educational social movements). Therefore, I needed a "conceptual scaffolding" that could be equally applicable to activism/social movements, business strategy or bureaucratic management.

Thus, my original focus on compassionate environmental activism was transformed into a notion of compassionate environmental governance.

Image & Identity Theories

The possible examples of compassionate environmental goveranance, or even of activism for that matter, had very little of a conceptual foundation to offer. Sarvodaya Shramadana centered its work on meeting a list of needs on the ground (or rather, basic satisfiers), Engaged Buddhism had ethical roots that were difficult to transfer into the Latin American context, and Green Sangha never responded to my emails. Other initiatives, like those of the NVC social change and climate change groups, were too focused on the practical and not on changing schemes on social organization.

This then led me to Cottam's Image Theory, to social Identity Theory and to Environmental Framing. However, these once more where on a different side of the spectrum. Image Theory, derived from political psychology analysis from the times of the cold war, was predominantly focused on inter-state perceptions. Identity theory had a strong focus of inter-ethnicity. Environmental framing seemed to have primarily an interpretative approach, and therefore an application that suggested a compassionate framework was hard to implement.

Integrally-informed and Deliberative Approaches

Ken Wilber's Integral Theory, and its derivations in the fields of ecology and sustainability, seemed to provide a better suited lens for the analysis I had in mind. Spiral dynamics allowed for an understanding of paradigms that could not communicate with one another, while AQAL, especially the four quadrants, allowed for a balanced assessment of subjective and objective drivers for the development of enemy images.

My discovery of deliberative democratic theory provided me with a way of framing the concerns of the tibetan concept of Drala (beyond enemies) by using a term that was more palatable to decision-makers than compassion. Deliberation represents a way of representing the notion of compassion in a similar light to how it is expressed by the Buddhist teachings of skillful means. Democratic deliberation involves listening without prejudgement, self-reflection, as well as the commitment to finding a solution (along with a belief in the fairness, truth and beauty of the "better argument").

Instrumentalizing through Subjectivity

Where my study is challenging, but also where it promises to contribute in an innovative way, is in my choice of approaching inquirty through the loose-ended use of political psychology over the more established framework (for this subject matter) of political ecology.

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There's been a hiatus of about 10 weeks between my original writing of these notes and my new reading of them and present attempt to elaborate further. I am struck at the timeliness of some of these ideas and their potential for unraveling (exploding?) into powerful transformative concepts. I'm amazed that last year, Deliberative Democracy was the topic of two major international conferences: one of the Environmental & Public Policy Division of the Association for Conflict Resolution, and another one at Princeton University.

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Okay, it's back to find the thread of where I was going to with this article. Summarizing some of the ideas of my previous article (in Spanish), when it comes to weaknesses in environmental governance, subjectivities have been very much neglected in the analysis of the hurdles to good environmental governance.

Political ecology and mainstream environmental policy analyses tend to focus on systemic factors, particularly human pressures on the resource base, complex constraints in ecological resilience, economic drivers and institutional arrangements.

However, intersubjectivity (people's capacity to reflect, lifestyle aspirations, identity) and intra-subjectivity (categorization of others, group identities, discourse) also have an important role to play in allowing environmental management to be fair, effective and consistent with resource capacities and constraints. Subjectivity has an particularly essential role to play where it comes to the democratization of environmental governance.

Although starting from the vantage point of subjectivities might feel like going out on a limb, it is actually coherent with the approach of modern schools of conflict management and peacebuilding ... from Fisher & Ury's principled negotiation that begins by separating the person from the problem; to Rosenber's Nonviolent Communication model that instructs looking beyond a person's thoughts into her feelings in order to identify her needs.

By dealing with intrapersonal (reflexive) elements and interpersonal issues, it is possible to move into what Giddens refers to as "generative politics" and therefore to build the necessary trust and lead to the collective configuration of new attitudes, relationships and institutions.

However, this can only be accomplished if there is both competent facilitation and also if the stakeholders have the necessary skills and the appropriate predisposition to engage in this level of democratic practice. Therefore, it is important not to understate the importance of preparatory work.

All this can be equated to working on the emotional intelligence of the "field" (in Kurt Lewin's terms), both in terms of the stakeholders, their attitudes, their expectations and the institutional arrangements.

Democracy as a Bridge and as a Provocation

The transformative aspect of this process is sough in part by using democracy as both a bridge, that offers stakeholders the possibility of generate trust based on the realization of mutual needs (like inclusion, respect and resolution); and as a provocation, guiding them into cognitive dissonance with their stereotypes and narrow prejudices about those who have opposing views.

The process seeks to put the espoused democratic values into practice through facilitated exchanges, as well as to use democracy as a the very subject of the discussion.